argues that, "those who believe that a basic weakness of the United States government is the recurrent conflict and deadlock between the executive and legislative branches must turn, at the outset, to the problem of divided government." Presidents from James Madison to George Bush have complained about conflicts with Congress and the effects of divided party government. President Lincoln complained in jest that, "I have been told I was on the road to hell, but I had no idea it was just a mile down the road with a Dome on it" (Udall 1988, 3). President Lyndon Baines Johnson, known for his success in working with Senators and Representatives as well as his bluntness, said, "A long time ago I learned that telling a man to go to hell and making him go are two different propositions" (Udall 1988, 239).
Reformers from Woodrow Wilson to James and argue that divided government is the root of inefficiency and deadlock in our democracy and that there is a need for reform. Wilson's complaint is repeated by those who argue in the 1980s and 1990s that divided government led to budget deficits and stalemate (quoted in Pfiffner 1991, 44): "You have a Government that is not responding to the wishes of the people. You have a Government that is not functioning, a Government whose very energies are stayed and postponed. If you want to release the force of the American People, you have got to get possession of the Senate and the Presidency as well as the House." Michael Mezey (1991, argues that our present system of separation of powers and James L. Sundquist (1986, 75) argues that, "those who believe that a basic weakness of the United States government is the recurrent conflict and deadlock between the executive and legislative branches must turn, at the outset, to the problem of divided government." Presidents from James Madison to George Bush have complained about conflicts with Congress and the effects of divided party government. President Lincoln complained in jest that, "I have been told I was on the road to hell, but I had no idea it was just a mile down the road with a Dome on it" (Udall 1988, 3). President Lyndon Baines Johnson, known for his success in working with Senators and Representatives as well as his bluntness, said, "A long time ago I learned that telling a man to go to hell and making him go are two different propositions" (Udall 1988, 239).
Reformers from Woodrow Wilson to James and argue that divided government is the root of inefficiency and deadlock in our democracy and that there is a need for reform. Wilson's complaint is repeated by those who argue in the 1980s and 1990s that divided government led to budget deficits and stalemate (quoted in Pfiffner 1991, 44): "You have a Government that is not responding to the wishes of the people. You have a Government that is not functioning, a Government whose very energies are stayed and postponed. If you want to release the force of the American People, you have got to get possession of the Senate and the Presidency as well as the House." Michael Mezey (1991, argues that our present system of separation of powers and divided party control of government cannot produce informed, coherent, timely, and effective laws. Mezey (1989, 143) claims that, "neither the executive nor the Congress is capable of action on its own and each is capable of stopping the other from acting."
In the years since Sundquist (1986) first advocated major constitutional reforms, the discussion of divided government has suffered from insufficient attention as to why it occurs and with what consequences, the purpose of this PS symposium. The critics of divided government often assert that it makes government inefficient and unaccountable, but they do not present comprehensive data analysis to support their case. And few critics comment on the function of representation that divided government provides so well for congressional constituencies.
Divided government occurs when one party controls the presidency while one or both houses of Congress are controlled by the opposing party, the standard of post-World War II American politics. From 1946 to 1992, the Truman presidency through the first four years of the Bush presidency, divided party control of the federal government has occurred 67 percent of the time (or 30 out of 45 years).2 From 1897 to 1945, divided government appeared only 12 percent of the time (6 times).
While it is clear that divided government is an important issue for our time, several competing explanations for the occurrence of divided government are offered in this PS symposium and in a growing literature , 1-8) on the topic. These explanations are based upon a variety of factors, as follows: the divided party control of government cannot produce informed, coherent, timely, and effective laws. Mezey (1989, 143) claims that, "neither the executive nor the Congress is capable of action on its own and each is capable of stopping the other from acting."
While it is clear that divided government is an important issue for our time, several competing explanations for the occurrence of divided government are offered in this PS symposium and in a growing literature , 1-8) While it is clear that divided government is an important issue for our time, several competing explanations for the occurrence of divided government are offered in this PS symposium and in a growing literature (Thurber 1991, 1-8) on the topic. These explanations are based upon a variety of factors, as follows: the constitutional structure of government (separation of powers); electoral behavior and the political party system (different constituency bases, ticket splitting, candidate individualism, political recruitment, the power of incumbency, and the weaknesses of American political parties); and public opinion (the preference of American voters to want divided government in principle). A synthesis of these varying explanations is necessary in order to understand the reasons why we have divided government, but we do not know the relative importance of each explanation since the competing theories have not been judged against each other.
As basic textbooks on American politics tell us, the constitutional separation of powers structures executive-legislative rivalry into predictable and almost guaranteed conflict. Although never mentioned in the Constitution, the historic competing interests of the two major political parties have exacerbated this conflict between the president and Congress because the opposing interests guarantee that the president and a majority of both houses of Congress will not share the same policy or ideological preferences (Edwards 1989, 96-97) . The authors of the Constitution provided for checks and balances among the three organizationally separate branches of government which make our government contentious, complicated, and inefficient, but also representative. Separation of powers and divided government thus frustrate those who would have government pass laws in a more timely manner. However, separation of the powers of Congress and the executive and divided party government both check despotism and allow for the constitutional structure of government (separation of powers); electoral behavior and the political party system (different constituency bases, ticket splitting, candidate individualism, political recruitment, the power of incumbency, and the weaknesses of American political parties); and public opinion (the preference of American voters to want divided government in principle). A synthesis of these varying explanations is necessary in order to understand the reasons why we have divided government, but we do not know the relative importance of each explanation since the competing theories have not been judged against each other.
As basic textbooks on American politics tell us, the constitutional separation of powers structures executive-legislative rivalry into predictable and almost guaranteed conflict. Although never mentioned in the Constitution, the historic competing interests of the two major political parties have exacerbated this conflict between the president and Congress because the opposing interests guarantee that the president and a majority of both houses of Congress will not share the same policy or ideological preferences (Edwards 1989, 96-97) . The authors of the Constitution provided for checks and balances among the three organizationally separate branches of government which make our government contentious, complicated, and inefficient, but also representative. Separation of powers and divided government thus frustrate those who would have government pass laws in a more timely manner. However, separation of the powers of Congress and the executive and divided party government both check despotism and allow for the Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium Symposium protection of representation. The federal government is built upon a purposeful fragmentation of power, a method of representing diverse local interests against the concentration of power in the hands of a president and his partisans in Congress, but it is also not without its frustrations.
Some (Ornstein 1990, 62) .
Presidential coattails have also become shorter in recent elections, protection of representation. The federal government is built upon a purposeful fragmentation of power, a method of representing diverse local interests against the concentration of power in the hands of a president and his partisans in Congress, but it is also not without its frustrations.
Some argue that a lack of partisan consensus between the president and the Congress stems from several electoral factors. The different nature of congressional and presidential constituencies and elections makes it probable that the president and the Congress will have divergent policy preferences, and different party and ideological preferences, the foundations for divided government. The president is said to have a national constituency and must appeal to voters on national issues. Members of Congress, on the other hand, have more homogeneous constituencies and appeal to voters on more parochial issues. The battle over the 1991 highway bill is a classic example of this conflict between presidential (national) and congressional (local) constituencies. The president wants a highway bill that addresses national transportation needs while members of Congress want to provide for their local constituencies. Thus lawmakers included over 500 "demonstration" projects in the highway legislation that earmarked funds for roads and bridges in their specific congressional districts and states and the president opposed them as "pork." Clearly, members of Congress respond to a narrower set of pressures than the president, because of smaller, more homogeneous, narrowly focused constituencies.
The increase in split ticket voting (shown in Table 1 Presidential coattails have also become shorter in recent elections, protection of representation. The federal government is built upon a purposeful fragmentation of power, a method of representing diverse local interests against the concentration of power in the hands of a president and his partisans in Congress, but it is also not without its frustrations.
The increase in split ticket voting (shown in Table 1 (Ornstein 1990, 63) . These shortened presidential coattails with increased ticket splitting, therefore, lead to a higher probability of divided control of the White House and Congress.
Other scholars ) and reformers argue that the weakness of political parties inside and outside of government has led to divided government. By any measure, party organizations have lost power from 1946 to present, the period of divided government. For example, with the expansion of primaries rather than conventions, parties have lost control over candidate recruitment and the election process in many states. As campaign finance, access to the media, and the management of campaigns has shifted from parties to professionals, the parties have lost control further of how candidates run under their label. Communication of the party position also is often in the hands of candidatecentered campaigns. Furthermore, the number of party identifiers and of eligible citizens that turn out to vote has dropped dramatically in the last two decades, and contributions from individuals and political action committees make up 98 percent of congressional candidate financing. Federal campaign funding of presidential campaigns has allowed candidates to be independent of most party organizations as well, leading to an increase in candidate-oriented campaigns. These circumstances have led to presidential and congressional candidates running as "outsiders" to their own parties (e.g., Carter in 1976, Reagan in 1980), and the decline in the proportion of partyline voters in House elections reveals that voting is increasingly candidate centered (Ornstein 1990, 65) . Without party control of recruitment, greater party-line voting, and a unified party philosophy for presidential and congressional candidates, it is difficult to have party discipline and a unified government after an election. divided party control of government. When comparing the president's vote with the vote for his party's successful House candidates and the number of districts carried by the president, there are ever decreasing presidential coattails in the last twenty years (Ornstein 1990, 63) . These shortened presidential coattails with increased ticket splitting, therefore, lead to a higher probability of divided control of the White House and Congress.
Other scholars ) and reformers argue that the weakness of political parties inside and outside of government has led to divided government. By any measure, party organizations have lost power from 1946 to present, the period of divided government. For example, with the expansion of primaries rather than conventions, parties have lost control over candidate recruitment and the election process in many states. As campaign finance, access to the media, and the management of campaigns has shifted from parties to professionals, the parties have lost control further of how candidates run under their label. Communication of the party position also is often in the hands of candidatecentered campaigns. Furthermore, the number of party identifiers and of eligible citizens that turn out to vote has dropped dramatically in the last two decades, and contributions from individuals and political action committees make up 98 percent of congressional candidate financing. Federal campaign funding of presidential campaigns has allowed candidates to be independent of most party organizations as well, leading to an increase in candidate-oriented campaigns. These circumstances have led to presidential and congressional candidates running as "outsiders" to their own parties (e.g., Carter in 1976, Reagan in 1980), and the decline in the proportion of partyline voters in House elections reveals that voting is increasingly candidate centered (Ornstein 1990, 65) . Without party control of recruitment, greater party-line voting, and a unified party philosophy for presidential and congressional candidates, it is difficult to have party discipline and a unified government after an election.
Once elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incumOnce elected, the power of incum- Critics of split party control of government ) assert that an important, negative effect of divided government is the failure of the federal government to pass a budget on time and to make reductions in the deficit. Others argue (Mezey 1991 ) that divided government caused the passage of new budget reforms such as GrammRudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act I and II and special budget "summits." A review of cases comparing when budgets were passed on time and when they were late (the norm of the 1980s) reveals no relationship between party control of government and timeliness (Thurber 1989 ). Both parties are delinquent. There also seems to be no statistical relationship between divided party control of the White House and Congress and deficit financing since World War II. Loss of budget control has also been blamed on divided government, but the relationship between unified government and controllability of discretionary spending in the federal budget does not exist. The decrease in the relative controllability of the budget has been linear since the 1950s. The budget process reforms from 1974 to 1990 have shown that reform is no substitute for leadership and the will of the people.
What about success of presidents to impound funds under unified and divided party control? Again, although the number of examples are few, there is no relationship between divided party control of government and the failure of presidential impoundments or, for that matter, presidential vetoes of money bills (Thurber 1991a, 162 Critics of split party control of government ) assert that an important, negative effect of divided government is the failure of the federal government to pass a budget on time and to make reductions in the deficit. Others argue (Mezey 1991 ) that divided government caused the passage of new budget reforms such as GrammRudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act I and II and special budget "summits." A review of cases comparing when budgets were passed on time and when they were late (the norm of the 1980s) reveals no relationship between party control of government and timeliness (Thurber 1989 ). Both parties are delinquent. There also seems to be no statistical relationship between divided party control of the White House and Congress and deficit financing since World War II. Loss of budget control has also been blamed on divided government, but the relationship between unified government and controllability of discretionary spending in the federal budget does not exist. The decrease in the relative controllability of the budget has been linear since the 1950s. The budget process reforms from 1974 to 1990 have shown that reform is no substitute for leadership and the will of the people.
What about success of presidents to impound funds under unified and divided party control? Again, although the number of examples are few, there is no relationship between divided party control of government and the failure of presidential impoundments or, for that matter, presidential vetoes of money bills (Thurber 1991a, 162 Critics of split party control of government ) assert that an important, negative effect of divided government is the failure of the federal government to pass a budget on time and to make reductions in the deficit. Others argue (Mezey 1991 Critics of split party control of government ) assert that an important, negative effect of divided government is the failure of the federal government to pass a budget on time and to make reductions in the deficit. Others argue (Mezey 1991 ) that divided government caused the passage of new budget reforms such as GrammRudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act I and II and special budget "summits." A review of cases comparing when budgets were passed on time and when they were late (the norm of the 1980s) reveals no relationship between party control of government and timeliness (Thurber 1989 ). Both parties are delinquent. There also seems to be no statistical relationship between divided party control of the White House and Congress and deficit financing since World War II. Loss of budget control has also been blamed on divided government, but the relationship between unified government and controllability of discretionary spending in the federal budget does not exist. The decrease in the relative controllability of the budget has been linear since the 1950s. The budget process reforms from 1974 to 1990 have shown that reform is no substitute for leadership and the will of the people.
What about success of presidents to impound funds under unified and divided party control? Again, although the number of examples are few, there is no relationship between divided party control of government and the failure of presidential impoundments or, for that matter, presidential vetoes of money bills (Thurber 1991a, 162) . Although Reagan enjoyed success in lowering taxes and reordering the budget when Since there is so little variance in divided government at the federal level in post-World War II American politics, a good way to test the consequences of divided party government is to evaluate the experience of state governors and legislatures. This method has the advantage of having a larger number of cases and more variance in the variables used to explain the causes and consequences of divided government. Are the budgetary crises in the states related to divided government or new "zero sum" politics which has hit both the federal government and the states A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. A particular shortcoming in need of a remedy is the structural inability of our government to propose, legislate, and administer a balanced program for governing. In parliamentary terms one might say that under the U.S. Constitution it is not now feasible to "form a government." The separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today. 
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